Abstract: Privacy is a software quality that is closely related to security. The main difference is 1 that security properties aim at the protection of assets that are crucial for the considered system, and 2 privacy aims at the protection of personal data that are processed by the system. The identification 3 of privacy protection needs in complex systems is a hard and error prone task. Stakeholders whose 4 personal data are processed might be overlooked, or the sensitivity and the need of protection 5 of the personal data might be underestimated. The later personal data and the needs to protect 6 them are identified during the development process, the more expensive it is to fix these issues, 7 because the needed changes of the system-to-be often affect many functionalities. In this paper, we 8 present a systematic method to identify the privacy needs of a software system based on a set of 9 functional requirements by extending the problem-based privacy analysis (ProPAn) method. Our 10 method is tool-supported and automated where possible to reduce the effort that has to be spent 11 for the privacy analysis, which is especially important when considering complex systems. The 12 contribution of this paper is a semi-automatic method to identify the relevant privacy requirements 13 for a software-to-be based on its functional requirements. The considered privacy requirements 14 address all dimensions of privacy that are relevant for software development. As our method is 15 solely based on the functional requirements of the system to be, we enable users of our method to 16 identify the privacy protection needs that have to be addressed by the software-to-be at an early 17 stage of the development. As initial evaluation of our method, we show its applicability on a small 18 electronic health system scenario. 
Introduction

22
Privacy is a software quality that is closely related to security and that is gaining more and more 23 attention in the public. Security is in general concerned with the protection of assets that are important 24 in the context of the considered system against malicious attackers that want to get access to the assets, 25 influence the content of the assets or affect the assets' availability. In contrast, privacy is concerned 26 with the protection of personal data 1 against malicious but also unintended processing, disclosure, 27 or alternation. Such events may even be caused by the end-users themselves due to insufficient 28 privacy awareness, or due to a lack of controls. Hence, privacy includes security properties that For personal data, we use the following definition of the European Commision [1] : "'personal data' means any information relating to a data subject". Throughout the paper, we use the terms personal information and personal data synonymously. requirement R6 refers to the patient from whom the vital signs are recorded and to the mobile device 
Overview of our Method
implied by the functional requirements and the identified domain knowledge as introduced in [9, 146 13], and we identify the personal data that are processed by the system under consideration, how it 147 flows through the system and at which places (domains) the personal data are available and in which 148 quality it is available there as introduced in [13] . These outputs produced during the first step form 149 the foundation of the following steps. The following steps form the main contribution of this paper.
151
In the second step of our method (Generate Privacy Requirements Candidates), we use the identified 152 flow of personal data and the information about the personal data at domains to automatically generate 153 the privacy requirements that are implied by the provided input. In this paper, we consider the 154 generation of privacy requirements related to the protection goals for privacy engineering proposed 155 by Hansen [5] . These protection goals include the classical security goals confidentiality, integrity, and 156 availability and the privacy goals unlinkability, transparency, and intervenability. we identified as personal data for the Patient among others the following:
243
• The healthStatus that contains all data that is related to the patient's health and that is processed 244 by the EHS. The health status is considered to be sensitive personal data and it can itself not 245 directly be linked to the single individuals it belongs to, but due to the contained information, it
246
can be linked to a group of individuals it possibly belongs to. The health status is collected in 247 different ways from the patient, it is collected directly from the patient, e.g., during interviews 248 with a doctor, it is indirectly collected by observation of his/her vital signs, and it is also reused 249 from already existing data bases (cf. Figure 6 ).
250
• The patientDemographics summarize details of the patient such as contact information, insurance 251 number, and billing contact. This information suffices to identify the single individual it belongs 252 to, it is considered as sensitive information, and it is collected directly from the patient, e.g., during 253 interviews with a doctor, and by reuse of already existing data sets (cf. Figure 6 ).
254
Additionally, the personal data vitalSigns that, e.g., represent records of patients' pulse 255 and blood pressure, mobileDevices that represent information about patients' mobile devices,
256
patientInsuranceContract that represent contracts that patients have with their insurances, and 257 healthInformation that are used by insurance companies to select the patients' insurance contracts and 258 tariffs are also considered as personal data of patients that are processed by the system-to-be. 
Personal Data Flow Analysis
260
In the fourth sub-step, the user analyzes how the personal data that were identified in the 261 previous step flows through the system due to the functional requirements and domain knowledge.
262
The documentation of these data flows and the personal data identified in the previous sub-step form 263 the foundation for the automatic generation and validation of privacy requirements.
264
To document which information is available at which domain, we use so-called available Figure 8 shows all personal information that was identified for the patient. During the personal 296 data flow analysis new personal information was identified based on the personal data that were 297 identified during the step Identification of Personal Data (cf. Figure 6 ). All newly identified personal 298 data can be derived from or is contained in the initially identified personal data and additionally,
299
we also identified contains and derivedFrom relations among the initially identified personal data.
300
For example, we identified that the healthInformation of patients can be derived from the patient's healthStatus. Furthermore, it was identified that the diagnosis, which doctors create for patients, and 302 the chosen treatment are derived from the patient's healthStatus by doctors. And from the diagnosis 303 and treatment, the costs for the performed treatment (treatmentCosts) can be derived. Figure 7 shows which personal information of patients are available at the insurance application.
305
For example, from requirement R3 (attribute origin) it was identified that for accounting, the patient's 306 diagnosis, treatment, treatment costs, and insurance number are sent to the insurance application.
307
This information is kept available there until there are no further legal obligations to keep it and it has 308 to be deleted. It is documented that this information has to be available at the insurance application 309 due to assumption A5 (attribute purpose) to ensure that insurance employees are able to perform the 310 accounting.
311 Figure 9 shows which relations between the personal data of patients is available at the 312 insurance application. For example, it is (globally) documented that the patient's billing contact 313 and the patient's insurance number are contained in the patient's demographics (cf. Figure 8 ).
314
Additionally, it is documented that from requirement R3 it was identified that for accounting the 315 patient's diagnosis, treatment, treatment costs, and insurance number are linkable to each other at 316 the insurance application. This linkability is obviously needed for the accounting to be able to check 317 whether the treatment and the associated costs are covered by the patient's insurance contract.
318 Figure 9 . View on the available information diagram for the insurance application showing which links between the personal data of the patient are available at the insurance application
Generate Privacy Requirements Candidates
319
To automatically generate privacy requirements candidates, we make use of the artifacts elicited 320 in the previous step and documented in the ProPAn model. We assume that these artifacts reflect 321 the intended information processing that is introduced by the system-to-be and that occur in its 322 environment. This means, we generate the privacy requirements on the assumption that only the 323 intended processing may be performed and the end-users shall be informed about this processing.
324
In this context, we aim at eliciting all relevant privacy requirements. The user can then decide in the 325 next step of our method (see Section 7) to remove or change the generated privacy requirements if the 326 assumptions made were too strong or too weak.
327
The ways how we identify the privacy requirements differs for the different kinds of 328 privacy requirements. We consider the six protection goals for privacy engineering unlinkability, 329 transparency, intervenability, confidentiality, integrity, and availability proposed by Hansen et al. [5] . terminology, we created the UML profile shown in Figure 10 . The top-level privacy requirement 352 was originally introduced in [9] and specifies the core of every privacy requirement, namely the 353 stakeholder who shall be protected, the counterstakeholders from whom the stakeholder shall be 354 protected, and the personal data (expressed as phenomena) of the stakeholder that shall be protected.
355
For the protection goal unlinkability, we derived the sub-requirements pseudonomity, unlinkability,
356
and undetectability. The sub-requirement unlinkability is further refined into data unlinkability
357
(requires that certain personal data shall not be linkable to each other) and anonymity (requires that 358 certain personal data shall not be linkable to the corresponding individual). Note that the privacy
359
property unobservability is not represented as a separate requirement, but it can be expressed by 360 instantiating respective anonymity and undetectability requirements (cf. [14] ). For the automatic 361 generation, we only consider the following requirements that may be refined into pseudonymity 362 requirements in the step Adjust Privacy Requirements (Section 7). In Section 7, also the meaning of a 363 pseudonymity requirement is explained. The counterstakeholders shall not be able to sufficiently distinguish whether the personal 381 information phenomena of the stakeholder exists or not.
382
If a personal information of a stakeholder is not available at a counterstakeholder and also not part 383 of any personal information available at the counterstakeholder, then we assume that this personal 384 information is undetectable for the counterstakeholder. Note that an undetectability requirement 385 may be too strong for this case, because the counterstakeholder may be allowed to know that a 386 specific personal information exists, but not allowed to know the content of it. Hence, the user may 387 weaken an undetectability requirement in the next step of our method (Section 7) to a confidentiality 388 requirement.
389
To keep the number of requirements that are generated small, we create for each pair of 
Application to Running Example
397
For the sake of simplicity, we only consider the stakeholder patient and the counterstakeholder 398 insurance employee for the generation of the unlinkability requirements.
399
To the biddable domain insurance employee the same personal information of the patient is 400 available as at the insurance application (cf. Figure 7) . Hence, an undetectability requirement 401 is generated for the counterstakeholder insurance employee and the stakeholder patient with all 402 personal data of the patient (cf. Figure 8 ) that is not available at the insurance employee as value for 403 the attribute phenomena. The undetectability requirement is represented in the first row in Figure 11 . 
Data Unlinkability linkability=single
(treatmentCosts,diagnosis), (treatmentCosts,patientDemographics), (treatmentCosts,healthInformation), (treatmentCosts,instructions), (treatmentCosts,alarms), (treatmentCosts,insuranceNumber), (treatmentCosts,patientBillingContact), (treatmentCosts,patientInsuranceContract), (treatmentCosts,treatment), (treatmentCosts,appointments),(diagnosis,patientDemographics), (diagnosis,healthInformation), (diagnosis,instructions), (diagnosis,alarms), (diagnosis,insuranceNumber), (diagnosis,patientBillingContact), (diagnosis,patientInsuranceContract), (diagnosis,treatment), (diagnosis,appointments), (patientDemographics,healthInformation), (patientDemographics,instructions), (patientDemographics,alarms), (patientDemographics,insuranceNumber), (patientDemographics,patientBillingContact), (patientDemographics,patientInsuranceContract), (patientDemographics,treatment), (patientDemographics,appointments), (healthInformation,instructions), (healthInformation,alarms), (healthInformation,insuranceNumber), (healthInformation,patientBillingContact), (healthInformation,patientInsuranceContract), (healthInformation,treatment), (healthInformation,appointments), (instructions,alarms), (instructions,insuranceNumber), (instructions,patientBillingContact), (instructions,patientInsuranceContract), (instructions,treatment), (instructions,appointments), (alarms,insuranceNumber), (alarms,patientBillingContact), (alarms,patientInsuranceContract), (alarms,treatment), (alarms,appointments), (insuranceNumber,patientBillingContact), (insuranceNumber,patientInsuranceContract), (insuranceNumber,treatment), (insuranceNumber,appointments), (treatment,appointments), (patientBillingContact,patientInsuranceContract), (patientBillingContact,treatment), (patientBillingContact,appointments), (patientInsuranceContract,treatment), (patientInsuranceContract,appointments) For each pair of personal information pairs of the stakeholder, the counterstakeholders shall at most 413 be able to link instances of the two elements of the pair to each other with linkability linkability.
Note that a data unlinkability requirement with linkability single does not constrain the system-to-be 415 to ensure that counterstakeholders are not able to link personal data of the stakeholder to each 416 other, but nevertheless, we make this information explicit to document that this linkability is 417 intended. We generate for each combination of stakeholder and counterstakeholder at most three 418 data unlinkability requirements. Namely, one for each linkability (single, group, and anonymous) 419 with which a counterstakeholder may be able to relate a personal information to the corresponding 420 stakeholder. The information whether two pieces of personal information are linkable to each other 421 by a counterstakeholder can be derived from his/her available information diagram using the linkable 422 relation and the globally defined contains relation (cf. Section 5.4).
423
The linkable relation has a transitive nature. That is, if a personal information a is linkable to it is linkable to each other and to which of the three data unlinkability requirements for s and c it has 443 to be added. In this way, we set the attribute pairs. The attribute phenomena is set to the set of all 444 personal information that is contained in a pair of the attribute pairs of the same requirement.
445
Application to Running Example
446
To the biddable domain insurance employee not only the same personal information of the 447 patient is available as at the insurance application, also the same personal information is linkable 448 to each other for the insurance employee with the same linkability. Hence, we can see from Figure 7 449 that all personal information available to the insurance employee is connected to each other in the 450 transitive closure of the linkable relation with linkability single. That is, an insurance employee is 451 able to know which pieces of personal information that are available to him/her belong to each 452 other. Thus, we only obtain one data unlinkability requirement, namely for the linkability single, because there is no pair of personal data available at the insurance employee that is not linkable with 454 linkability single. This data unlinkability requirement is represented by the third row in Figure 11 and 455 contains all 55 pairs of the 11 pieces of personal information available to the insurance employee. The counterstakeholders shall at most be able to link the personal information phenomena to the 460 stakeholder with linkability linkability.
461
Note that an anonymity requirement with linkability single does not constrain the system-to-be 462 to preserve the anonymity of the stakeholders personal data against counterstakeholders, but 463 nevertheless, we make this information explicit to document that this linkability is intended. Similar 464 to the data unlinkability requirements, we also instantiate three anonymity requirements for each pair 465 of stakeholder and counterstakeholder, namely, one for each of the possible linkabilities.
466
We have now to decide which personal information a can be related to the stakeholder s by the 467 counterstakeholder c with which linkability, to decide to which anonymity requirement's attribute 
472
But it is possible that we obtain at a domain a linkability of a to s that is greater than the linkability 473 u documented in the relatedTo relation. This case is illustrated in Figure 12 information to the stakeholder. The linkableTo relation is generated on demand by the tool, and is 482 used to instantiate anonymity requirements.
483
Application to Running Example
484
From the generation of the data unlinkability requirements, we know that all personal 485 information of the patient that is available at the insurance employee is linkable to each other 486 with linkability single. And from Figure 6 , we can see that, e.g., the personal information 487 patientDemographics can be related to the single patient it belongs to. Hence, the computed linkableTo 488 relation for the patient and the insurance employee returns for every personal information available 489 at the insurance employee the linkability single. That is, for every personal information available 490 to the insurance employee, he/she is able to know to which patient's demographics the personal 491 information belongs. Hence, he/she is able to relate, e.g., the patient's healthInformation, which in 492 isolation is only linkable to a group of possible patient's it might belong to, to the patient it belongs 493 to. Thus, we only generate one anonymity requirement for the patient and the insurance employee.
494
This anonymity requirement is shown in the second row of Figure 11 . [15] show that we will obtain an analogous 500 structure of intervenability requirements as we identified for transparency requirements. Hence,
501
we assume that we will be able to apply the same strategies for the identification of intervenability 502 requirements as we present for transparency requirements in this section. The taxonomy of transparency requirements (shown in Figure 13 ) distinguishes three kinds of 504 requirements. First, presentation requirements that are concerned about how the information has 505 to be presented to the stakeholder, second, processing information requirements that inform the 506 stakeholder how his/her data is processed by the system-to-be, and third, exceptional information 507 requirements that state that in the case of exceptional cases, e.g., privacy breaches, the stakeholder 508 and additional authorities have to be informed about these incidents. The first kind of requirements 509 has to be set up manually, as we cannot derive from the output of the first step of our method how 510 stakeholders have to be informed. Also the third kind of requirements cannot be derived from the 511 previously elicited information, but it will be possible to derive them when threats to the unlinkability 512 and security requirements are identified, which is part of our future work. For the second kind of 513 transparency requirements, we show how we can identify about which collection, flow, and storage 514 of personal data stakeholders have to be informed about. Figure 14 shows an excerpt of a stakeholder data flow graph (SDFG) that visualizes which 519 personal information of a stakeholder flows between which domains. For the sake of readability, the 520 SDFG does not show due to which statements the data flows, but this information is be deduced from 521 the available information diagrams when needed. For details on the generation of this graph see [16] . 
531
Note that the attribute counterstakeholder is not relevant for all processing information requirements 532 and hence, kept empty.
533
Data collection happens at those places in the system-to-be where personal information of 534 a stakeholder flows from a given domain to a designed domain, which represent parts of the 535 system-to-be (cf. Section 3). This is, because every information that is collected by the system-to-be 536 has to flow from outside the system-to-be (a given domain) to a part of it (a designed domain).
537
For each personal information p and stakeholder s for whom p represents personal 538 information, we instantiate a collection information requirement with the attributes stakeholder=s 539 and phenomena={p} if p flows from a given domain to a designed domain. Additionally, we can 540 automatically set the attributes purpose and method. As purpose, we set the statements due to which 541 p flows to the designed domain(s) and due to which it (or contained personal information) flows 542 from the designed domain further to other domains. The attribute method is instantiated using the 543 documented collection methods from the relatedTo relations in the personal information diagram of 544 s. All other attributes have to be adjusted by the user in next step of our method.
545
Application to Running Example
546
The data that is collected from patients can be derived from the in-going edges of the designed 547 lexical domain EHR in Figure 14 . In the EHS scenario, the electronic health records (EHR) are the 548 central point of the system-to-be where all data about patients is collected. For example, the patient's 549 vitalSigns are collected by the system-to-be from mobile devices, patients (indirectly through a 550 possible reuse of already existing health records), and doctors (contained in the personal information 551 healthStatus). Figure 15 shows the generated collection information requirement for the patient and Figure 8) . Hence, it is automatically derived that the vital signs are 560 collected for the purpose of all functional requirements. Note that we also consider the statements 561 due to which the information is collected (i.e., R1 and R6) as purpose. Hence, stakeholders have to be informed about all data flows that are introduced by the system-to-be.
572
Stakeholders do not have to be informed about the information flows inside the system-to-be, because 573 they only have to be informed about the behavior of the system-to-be as a whole. Additionally, 574 stakeholders do not have to be informed about information flows that happen independently of the 575 system-to-be, because these flows are out of the scope of the system-to-be. Hence, we only consider 576 the documented data flows to given domains that are caused by the system-to-be. We distinguish 577 two kinds of data flows introduced by the system-to-be.
578
First, the system-to-be may introduce flows of personal information from designed domains to 579 given domains. Second, there might be information flows between given domains that originate 580 from a functional requirement. This can be the case if a part of the system-to-be is only responsible to 581 forward personal information p of a stakeholder s from a given domain d 1 to another given domain 582 d 2 without collecting or storing the data itself. We instantiate a flow information requirement for each 583 combination of given domain d 2 and stakeholder s if a piece of personal information p of s is sent to 584 d 2 from a designed domain and/or due to a functional requirement from a given domain.
585
In both cases of information flows, we generate a flow information requirement with 586 stakeholder=s, phenomena={p}, and target=d 2 . Additionally, we can automatically set the attribute 587 purpose to the set of statements for which it was documented that the personal information p has 588 to be available at d 2 and due to which statements p flows to d 2 . The other attributes have to be set 589 manually by the user in the next step of our method.
given domains that originates from a functional requirement, but the SDFG for the patient (cf. Figure 14) shows two information flows from the designed lexical domain EHR to the given domains 594 insurance application and doctor. For the stakeholder patient, the target insurance application, and 595 the phenomenon treatmentCosts, we generate the flow information requirement shown in Figure 15 .
593
596
The purpose for which this information flows from the system-to-be to the insurance application is 597 deduced from the corresponding available information diagram shown in Figure 7 . The availableAt 598 relations documented in the available information diagram show that the personal information flows 599 because of the functional requirement R3 and is needed at it due to assumption A5. Hence, both 600 statements are documented as purpose for the flow of personal information. 
Storage Information Requirements
602
A storage information requirement has the following meaning:
603
The stakeholder shall be informed that his/her personal data phenomena are stored mandatoryly 604 by the system-to-be that is run by the controller. The phenomena's retention in the system-to-be 
610
Every personal information that is available at a designed domain, is stored by the system-to-be 611 for at least the time that it is necessary to be there to satisfy the functional requirements. We 612 instantiate for each pair of stakeholder s and personal information p of s a storage information 613 requirement if p is available at a designed domain. For a storage information requirement with 614 stakeholder=s and phenomena={p}, we set retention to the maximal duration with which it is available 615 at a designed lexical domain. The maximal duration is determined by the total ordering f orAction < 616 untilDeleted < unlimited. Additionally, we can automatically derive the purposes for which p is stored 617 by the system-to-be from the available information diagrams.
618
Application to Running Example
619
In the EHS scenario, all personal information that is collected by the EHS, is also stored by it.
620
Hence, we obtain for each collection information requirement also a storage information requirement.
621
For example, we get a storage information requirement for the patient and his/her vital signs similar 622 to the collection information requirement shown in Figure 15 , but instead of the attribute method it has 623 the attribute retention with value untilDeleted. The value untilDeleted is selected because the vital signs 624 may be retained longer as needed for the purpose, but they have to be deleted due to some regulations 625 if the patient's health record becomes outdated. Additionally, the EHS stores personal information 626 of the patient, that is derived from the collected personal information, e.g., the treatmentCosts are 627 derived from the diagnosis and treatment performed by doctors (cf. Figure 8 ) and stored at the 628 designed lexical domain Invoice. For the patient and his/her treatment costs, we generate the storage 629 information requirement shown in Figure 15 . The derived purpose for storing the treatment costs 630 are the functional requirements R3 and R4, which are concerned with the accounting and billing of 631 patients. Analogous to the storage information requirement for the patient and the vital signs, the 632 attribute retention is set to untilDeleted.
Security Requirements
634
In this paper, we consider the basic security requirements confidentiality, integrity, and 635 availability, which we interpret in the context of privacy. Figure 16 shows our UML profile to 636 represent the three security requirements.
637
Figure 16. Used Taxonomy of Security Requirements
A confidentiality requirement has the meaning:
638
The personal data phenomena of the stakeholder shall be kept confidential from counterstakeholder.
639
An integrity requirement has the meaning:
640
Random faults of the system and counterstakeholder shall not be able to negatively influence the 641 consistency and correctness of the personal data phenomena of the stakeholder.
642
An availability requirement has the meaning:
643
Random faults of the system and counterstakeholder shall not be able to negatively influence the 644 availability of the personal data phenomena to the corresponding stakeholder.
645
Note that if the set of counterstakeholders is left empty for an integrity or availability requirement, 646 then the meaning is that the integrity and availability of the stakeholder's personal data shall be 647 preserved against all possible counterstakeholders.
648
Our above definition of the security requirements also includes a dimension that is classically 649 assigned to safety requirements, namely random faults that may cause harm to the system. For 650 privacy, these random faults are also of relevance, because privacy issues may not only arise from 651 attacks a counterstakeholder might performs or unwanted incidents he/she might causes, but also 652 because of random faults that do not allow access to information or that delete or change the content 653 of the personal data of the stakeholder.
654
We do not generate confidentiality requirements during this step, but the user may refine an 655 undetectability requirement to a confidentiality requirement as already mentioned above in Section 656 6.1.1.
657
The generation of our general integrity and availability requirements is straightforward. We 658 instantiate for each stakeholder whose personal information is available at a designed domain one 659 integrity requirement and one availability requirement with the attribute phenomena set to the set of 660 all of the stakeholder's personal information that is available to the system-to-be, i.e., available at a 661 designed domain, and with an empty set counterstakeholder. During the next step of our method, the 662 user may decide to refine the set of counterstakeholders.
663
Application to Running Example
664
For the patient all personal data shown in Figure 8 except healthInformation and 665 patientInsuranceContract are available at designed domains and hence, we create corresponding 666 availability and integrity requirements.
Adjust Privacy Requirements
668
In this step, the user manually inspects the automatically generated privacy requirements and 669 has the possibility to complete and adjust these. In the following, we discuss the possibilities the 670 user has to complete and adjust the generated requirements based on the different kinds of privacy 671 requirements.
672
Unlinkability Requirements
673
The generated unlinkability requirements do not have to be completed, because all attributes of 674 them are already automatically set. The user only has to decide whether the identified requirements 675 really reflect the privacy protection needs. For each undetectability requirement, the user may decide that not all of the personal 678 information of the stakeholder s listed in the requirement has to be undetectable for the 679 counterstakeholder c. That is, a counterstakeholder c may be allowed to know that a specific kind 680 of information exists, but he/she shall not be able to know the exact content of the information.
681
Hence, a user can decide to introduce a confidentiality requirement for s and c and move the personal 682 information of s that only has to be kept confidential and not undetectable from the corresponding 683 undetectability requirement to the new confidentiality requirement. It is possible that the user decides 684 that all personal information shall only be kept confidential. Then the undetectability requirement is 685 completely replaced by the introduced confidentiality requirement.
686
Application to the Running Example
687
For the stakeholder patient and the counterstakeholder insurance employee, the undetectability 688 requirement shown in the first row of Figure 11 was generated. As it is not possible and needed 689 to hide the information that the eHealth system processes the patient's health status (including 690 vital signs), mobile devices (including their IDs), and notes about patient's, we decide to relax the 691 undetectability requirement to a confidentiality requirement. 
Anonymity and Data Unlinkability Requirements
693
For each anonymity and data unlinkability requirement, the user has to consider whether the 694 contained personal information or pairs of personal information belong to the correct requirement.
695
That is, the user has to decide whether the linkability of the personal information to the stakeholder 696 or the linkability between the pair of personal information was correctly derived from the ProPAn 697 model. The user can decide to weaken or strengthen the requirements by increasing or reducing the 698 linkability with which a personal information can be linked to the stakeholder or a pair of information 699 can be linked to each other by the counterstakeholder, respectively. The user can even decide that a 700 personal information shall be undetectable or confidential to the counterstakeholder.
701
Another possibility is that a user refines an anonymity requirement or a part of it to a 702 pseudonymity requirement (cf. Figure 11) . The meaning of a pseudonymity requirement is:
703
For the personal information phenomena of the stakeholder the counterstakeholder shall only be 704 able to relate it to a kind pseudonym and not to the stakeholder himself/herself. 
719
An anonymity requirement with linkability anonymous may be translated into a pseudonymity 720 requirement with kind transaction. A transaction pseudonym is only used once for one action or 721 information that is related to an individual. Hence, the pseudonyms themselves do not provide any 722 link to the individual they belong to.
723
For more details on the kinds of pseudonyms see [14] .
724
Application to the Running Example
725
We decide not to change or refine the anonymity and data unlinkability requirements for the 
Transparency Requirements
732
Not all attributes of the transparency requirements were automatically filled during the 733 generation of them. Hence, the user has to complete the generated transparency requirements 734 manually. Normally, we do not expect further modifications on the generated transparency 735 requirements, but the user can add, delete, or merge transparency requirements if needed. The completed versions of the transparency requirements of Figure 15 are shown in Figure 17 .
738
We added to all transparency requirements the same presentation requirement. This presentation 739 requirement states:
740
The information contained in the related transparency requirements has to be presented before the 741 data is collected from the stakeholder in English and made accessible to stakeholders by forwarding 742 the information to them.
There are no options to control or intervene into the processing of personal information for the patient, For the generated availability and integrity requirements, the user may decide for a specific 751 personal information that its integrity does not have to be ensured by the system-to-be, or that it does 752 not have to be made available to the corresponding stakeholder by the system-to-be. Furthermore,
753
the user may limit the availability and integrity requirements to a number of counterstakeholders that
754
shall not be able to negatively influence the availability or integrity of the stakeholders personal data.
755
756
We decide not to change or refine the integrity and availability requirements for the patient. 
Validate Privacy Requirements
758
In this step, we discuss how the privacy requirements adjusted by the user can be validated. in phenomena has to be personal information of the stakeholder.
Application to the Running Example
787
In this paper, we only consider the privacy requirements for patients. Hence, it has to be 788 checked for these privacy requirements whether the attribute phenomena only contains the personal 789 information presented in Figure 8 for validation condition VP1. During the adjustment of the unlinkability requirements, we only decided to turn the 842 undetectability requirement shown in Figure 11 into a confidentiality requirement. Hence, all 843 personal information of the patient occurs either in the confidentiality requirement, or in the 844 anonymity requirement with linkability single (cf. Figure 11) . Hence, VU1 does not raise an error 845 for any discussed undetectability, anonymity, and confidentiality requirements. The validation 846 condition VU2 does not raise an error for our confidentiality requirement that was created from 847 the undetectability requirement shown in Figure 11 , because the phenomena referenced by the 848 requirement are all not available at the counterstakeholder insurance employee (cf. Figure 7) .
849
VU3 and VU4 do not raise errors, because we did not strengthen the generated anonymity and 850 data unlinkability requirements and hence, the linkability attribute of these requirements is still that creates a UML-conform model can be used.
941
For the automatic and semi-automatic steps of our method, we use the Epsilon platform 8 .
942
Epsilon offers a variety of languages for, e.g., manipulating, transforming, and validating EMF-based 9 943 models. Additionally, Epsilon provides a language to specify wizards that can easily be integrated shown in Figure 18 . Then the user can select the step that he/she wants to perform for the selected 956 stakeholder. The steps correspond to the method steps that we introduced in this paper. From Figure 18 , we can see that our tool supports all sub-steps of the first step of our method
958
Analyze Flow of Personal Data that was discussed in Section 5. Furthermore, our tool supports the 959 second step of our method, namely the generation of privacy requirements (see Section 6). The 960 sub-steps of the first step of our method are semi-automatic steps that require further user interaction,
961
while the second step of our method is fully automatic and requires no further user interaction.
962
A part of the automatically generated privacy requirements for patients is shown as a tree view 963 on the UML model in Figure 18 . This tree view also shows that we structure the generated privacy 964 requirements using packages to avoid that users get lost in the number of privacy requirements 965 generated. We generate for each stakeholder for whom privacy requirements are generated a 966 package. In this package we add sub-packages for the protection goals unlinkability, security, and 967 transparency. The sub-package for unlinkability contains for each biddable domain that is considered 968 as a counterstakeholder in a privacy requirement belonging to the stakeholder a sub-package that 969 contains all unlinkability related privacy requirements. The sub-package for security contains the 970 stakeholder's confidentiality, integrity, and availability requirements. The transparency sub-package 971 includes for each personal information of the stakeholder for which a transparency requirement exists describe the behavioral and context models, and users' privacy requirements regarding the system.
1019
The behavioral and context model are then checked against the privacy requirements using model 
